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The Arab Spring: Triggers, Dynamics 
and Prospects
Stephan Rosiny
On 17 December 2010, the self-immolation of Tunisian vegetable vendor Mohammed 
Bouazizi sparked the Arab Spring. Within a few months, a wave of protest had swept 
away the despots of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Since then protests have been keeping 
the region, which has until recently been viewed as having stable authoritarian regimes 
and as being largely resistant to democratization, on edge.
Analysis
Since the outbreak of the Arab Spring, parliamentary elections and constitutional de-
bates have been taking place in North Africa and the Middle East and the public dis-
course has been defined by open criticism of the remaining autocracies. How fundamen-
tal and sustainable these changes will prove to be cannot yet be judged with certainty. 
However, some striking commonalities can be noted.
  The initial spontaneity and lightness with which the opposition movements called 
the regimes into question stunned not only Western observers but also the Arab rul-
ers themselves. After the initial surprise, the remaining autocracies returned – with 
only limited success to date – to their former methods of stabilizing their rule.
  The triggers, progression and intensity of the protests have varied from country to 
country. The reactions of the regimes have also ranged from cautious concessions 
to violent repression.
  Most Arab regimes suffer from massive legitimacy deficits, and the citizens are de-
manding to finally be able to participate more fairly in political, economic and soci-
etal events. Their protests exhibit similar symbols and reciprocal references. These 
parallels make the Arab Spring a momentous and novel event that will have a last-
ing impact on the region.
  Numerous Arab countries have seen a strengthening of moderate Islamist parties, 
which many people now view as competent and reliable alternatives to the exist-
ing regimes.
Keywords: Arab Spring, social movements, democratization, Islamism
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The Outbreak of the Arab Spring
The Arab Spring actually began in the middle 
of winter. On 17 December 2010 a municipal in-
spector in the provincial Tunisian city of Sidi 
Bouzid confiscated vegetable seller Mohammed 
Bouazizi’s cart because he did not have a vending 
license. The inspector followed the typical rou-
tine, meaning that the young merchant probably 
needed either stronger connections to an influen-
tial person or enough money for a bribe more than 
he needed a license. His appeals to the powers that 
be were denied. This mixture of humiliation and 
powerlessness was apparently what drove him to 
the desperate act of publicly self-immolating in 
front of the local government building.1 
In the following hours and days, spontaneous 
solidarity rallies cropped up, during which pro-
testors were killed by security forces and thus be-
came “martyrs” to be mourned at later rallies. 
Arab news channel Al-Jazeera, which eventual-
ly developed into the most important emotion-
provoking and mobilizing medium of the Arab 
Spring, showed clips of the self-immolation and of 
the related demonstrations that were filmed using 
cell phone cameras. The protests quickly reached 
the capital city of Tunis and spread to neighbor-
ing countries. They expanded not only regional-
ly but also in terms of social composition within 
individual countries. Soon, the protests includ-
ed people from all walks of life: while the partic-
ipants were mostly youth, protestors also includ-
ed children, adults, the elderly, women and men, 
Muslims and Christians, the religious and the sec-
ular. In less than two months, the two supposed-
ly most stable autocrats in the Middle East were 
overthrown: Tunisia’s Zine el-Abidin Ben Ali on 
14 January 2011, and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak on 
11 February 2011.
At the beginning of 2011, protests and unrest 
broke out in almost every Arab country. The only 
countries that have thus far managed to avoid 
such problems are the Gulf monarchies of Qatar 
and, experiencing only marginal protests, the 
U.A.E., both of which guarantee their populations 
a worry-free life bankrolled by oil income. 
The Arab Spring did not come out of left field. 
In most of the region’s countries there have been 
demonstrations and strikes protesting social 
1 Following his example, around the New Year dozens of other 
people self-immolated as well, though these acts did not have 
a similar mobilizing effect.
hardships and despotism for years; since 2000, 
these protests have increasingly developed into 
transnational movements. The outbreak of the 
Second Intifada in the Palestinian territories 
in 2000, the US-led war in Iraq in 2003, and the 
Muhammad caricatures in 2005 and 2006 led to 
protests against Western and Israeli “aggressions” 
and to solidarity rallies for the victims of those ac-
tions. These demonstrations focused only second-
arily on the inactivity of their own governments. 
Criticism of Israel’s conduct in both the Lebanon 
War with Hezbollah (2006) and the Gaza War 
(2008–09) was combined with rage at the regimes 
of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, who more or 
less openly sided with Israel.
The Dynamics of the Arab Spring Protests
Depending on political preference, either the 
Islamic Revolution of 1978–79 in Iran or the Cedar 
Revolution of March 2005 in Lebanon is cited as 
the role model for the Arab Spring’s opposition-
al mobilization. The former has until recently 
been the only fundamental system transforma-
tion in the Middle East caused by a revolution-
ary mass movement; the latter led nonetheless to 
the withdrawal of Syrian troops. Iran’s 2009 Green 
Revolution, following the fraudulent presidential 
election, is also often cited as a model.
Nevertheless, the border-transcending nature 
of its protests has marked the Arab Spring as a 
one-of-a-kind and monumental event. New are 
the protests’ wave-like expansion, their cross-
country interplay, and the astoundingly ideolo-
gy-free discourse of the participants. The regional 
mobilization is no longer directed primarily at ex-
ternal enemies such as the U.S. or Israel, but rath-
er advocates for an authentic Arab concern: the 
overthrow or the reform of authoritarian systems 
of rule. Cumulatively, the demonstrations have 
reached the level necessary to attract the attention 
of the global media; this has made it more difficult 
for the rulers to simply wait them out or to resort 
to sheer repression. 
The broad solidarity within all segments of so-
ciety as well as the movement’s spontaneity and 
largely leaderless nature initially surprised the 
regimes and undermined suppression strategies 
they had formerly employed, such as arresting 
political leaders and villainizing protesters as for-
eign agents. The violent repression – thousands of 
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demonstrators died – and the mobilization across 
all social classes gave the protesters a moral supe-
riority and legitimacy that was lost in inverse pro-
portion by the repressive regimes. The wall of si-
lence regarding the abuse of power – scandalous 
revelations on WikiLeaks about corruption and 
the political hypocrisy of the rulers started the ball 
rolling here – and the fear of state repression col-
lapsed. The hope that the autocratic rulers would 
fall one after the other due to a domino effect has, 
however, not been realized so far. Since March 
2011 they have increasingly been adapting to the 
new situation and have fallen back – with vary-
ing degrees of success – on time-tested tools for 
stabilizing their rule: They partially met the dem-
onstrators’ demands by scapegoating and replac-
ing unpopular ministers or entire governments, 
or by promising constitutional reforms. They 
tried to secure support by reversing cutbacks to 
state subsidies for staple foods and energy sourc-
es, introducing new subsidies, rapidly creating 
new jobs in the state bureaucracy and the secu-
rity apparatus, and promising wage increases. In 
Saudi Arabia King Abdullah announced two pro-
grams totaling 130 billion USD through which he 
would pay additional salary to civil servants, in-
troduce support for the unemployed, create more 
than 60,000 new jobs, renovate mosques, and fi-
nance a building project for more than 500,000 
apartments (Gause 2011). Saudi Arabia and oth-
er Gulf monarchies took the endangered regimes 
in Bahrain, Oman, Morocco and Jordan, as well as 
Egypt’s weak transitional military council (SCAF), 
under their wing with billions of dollars of sup-
port. Jordan and Morocco were offered admission 
to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the rich 
oil monarchies’ club.
The autocrats continued to focus on divid-
ing and discrediting the opposition. They bad-
mouthed the protesters as “agents” of foreign 
powers (Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia), as “sab-
oteurs” and “terrorists” (Syria), and as “rats and 
cockroaches” (Qaddafi in Libya), or they drew a 
fearsome picture of impending civil war along 
ethnic and religious lines (Bahrain, Syria). Political 
liberalization, they warned the West, would lead 
to increased power for Islamist fundamentalists 
and to jihadist terrorism (Yemen, Libya, Syria). 
When nothing else worked, they resorted to sheer 
repression. Bahrain set the precedent with the 
crushing of the occupation of Pearl Square, with 
the help of Saudi Arabian and U.A.E. troops, on 14 
March 2011. Yemen followed suit, with 2,000 dead 
to date; in Libya the corresponding number is ap-
proximately 30,000. In Syria the number of victims 
is approaching 10,000 – more than 7,000 civilians 
and over 2,000 security personnel have been killed 
so far. In all three countries, however, parts of the 
opposition also took up arms. In Libya an inter-
national military coalition under NATO command 
– supported by U.N. Resolution 1973, which was 
passed on 17 March 2011 – intervened in the con-
flict on the side of the insurgents.
The despots’ contradictory signals and fre-
quent changes in tactic between accommodation 
and repression led to the escalation of the rebel-
lions in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Syria. Their 
pledges of reform during ongoing violent re-
pression rendered these promises hollow. Hosni 
Mubarak’s disappointing speech on 10 February 
2011 could have been a warning for other rulers. 
He demonstrated absolutely no readiness to give 
up power, even though rumors that he would re-
sign had been circulating. This furthered the de-
termination of the demonstrators in Tahrir Square 
and sealed Mubarak’s downfall – the military re-
moved him from power the following day.
The monarchs, in contrast, conducted them-
selves much more cleverly – for example, King 
Mohammed VI of Morocco, who essentially po-
sitioned himself at the peak of the domestic re-
form movement by initiating a constitutional 
reform, thereby stabilizing his monarchy. The 
emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, even 
played the part of champion of the revolutionary 
transformation by financing the Al-Jazeera satel-
lite station, participating in the military operation 
against the Qaddafi regime, and taking a leading 
role in preparing the sanctions against the Syrian 
regime.
Protest Demands
At the beginning, there were two different con-
stellations at work in sparking the protests. In 
some countries, the educated youth were us-
ing social networking platforms such as Twitter 
and Facebook to call on people to demonstrate in 
the urban centers for more freedom and against 
despotism. These “happenings” had already oc-
curred now and then in Egypt, Bahrain, Lebanon 
and Tunisia. This time, though, things took a dif-
ferent form because unexpectedly large numbers 
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of protestors showed up, and state repression led 
not to the end of the protests but instead to their 
increasing mobilization and escalation. In other 
countries – for instance, Tunisia, Jordan, Bahrain, 
Syria and Oman – rallies were initially started on 
the periphery by marginalized groups (whether 
along social, sectarian, ethnic or provincial lines).
In some countries, the protests remained re-
stricted to individual groups, meaning that no 
broader, nationwide resistance was able to build 
up. In Saudi Arabia, the opposition splintered into 
the following groups: Shiites, who for decades had 
been demanding equal rights as citizens; women, 
who demonstrated publicly for their emancipa-
tion (symbolized by the right to drive); liberals, 
who demanded a loosening of rigid religious and 
social norms; and Salafists, for whom the mor-
al looseness in the conservative kingdom had al-
ready gone too far.
The resistance spread particularly within coun-
tries where localized and urban protests tended to 
become national movements: above all in Tunisia, 
Bahrain and Libya. The demands of these nation-
al movements were accordingly extensive and in-
cluded material improvements in the provision 
of food, housing and energy; improved servic-
es and better employment opportunities; and fi-
nally, reforms of the political system: democracy, 
the separation of powers, and reliable institutions. 
The demands were a reflection of the local con-
ditions. In Egypt, Algeria and Syria, protestors 
called for the repeal of emergency legislation; in 
Iraq, the withdrawal of American occupying forc-
es. Palestinians demanded that the West Bank’s 
Fatah and the Gaza Strip’s Hamas enter into a 
government of national unity to end the fragmen-
tation of the Palestinian Authority. In Lebanon, a 
civil society movement demonstrated for the abo-
lition of confessionalism, whereby family law and 
the division of political offices are determined by 
religious affiliation. Due to concerns over both in-
trasocietal polarization and the escalation of vio-
lence, the demands voiced by protesters in coun-
tries with histories of civil war like Lebanon, Iraq, 
Sudan, Algeria and Palestine were generally more 
moderate.
The unifying and overriding element of the 
socially heterogeneous protests was neverthe-
less moral and ethical principles, above all jus-
tice (adalah), freedom (hurriyah), dignity (karamah), 
and respect (ihtiram). The protesters’ demands 
included
 − that the authorities respect their rights as citi-
zens rather than arrogantly infantilizing them 
as subordinates;
 − a life of dignity rather than one defined by hu-
miliating condescension and oppression by the 
security forces and public authorities;
 − equality in access to resources and opportunities 
instead of clientelistic rewards for compliance;
 − rule of law in place of both despotic rule and 
special privileges for the elites; and finally,
 − the right to participate in the global trend to-
ward prosperity, progress, education and dem-
ocratic participation.
The most far-reaching demand, the overthrow 
of the current regime, was made only in coun-
tries where escalations of violence on the part of 
the respective regime took place, when incremen-
tal reforms under the existing elite thus no longer 
seemed possible. So far, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, 
Libya and Syria are the only countries whose pro-
testers have demanded regime change, although 
individual actors in Bahrain and Jordan have also 
levied demands to the tune of “al-Sha’b yurid isqat 
al-nizam” (“The people want to bring down the 
regime”).
The Symbolism of the Arab Spring
During the Arab Spring a similar symbolism be-
came evident across borders; this connected the 
otherwise heterogeneous protest movements and 
led to a reciprocal wave of increasing mobilization 
within the region. The symbols and slogans gener-
ated a culture of protest with a shared resonance 
which in turn led to its amplification. Social media 
such as Facebook and Twitter played a crucial role, 
as did cell phones; all of these were initially the 
most important means of communication and mo-
bilization. Music also played a decisive role in dis-
seminating the messages via pop culture.2 Satellite 
TV stations such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya 
rapidly joined in; they reached a much broader 
audience, generated more emotion, helped mo-
bilize populations, and made the connection to 
Western media, occasionally creating multi-link 
chains of communication: demonstrators’ English 
and Arabic placards – filmed with cell phones and 
2 The Tunisian rapper El Général (<www.youtube.com/watch 
?v=IeGlJ7OouR0> 28 December 2011) and the Israeli hip-hop 
artist Noy Alooshe became particularly popular.
- 5 -GIGA Focus International Edition 1/2012
posted on the Internet, then shown on Arab satel-
lite TV channels’ footage, which was then broad-
cast by Western TV stations – were directed at a 
national, regional and global public. 
The names Jasmine Revolution for Tunisia and 
Lotus Flower Revolution for Egypt, both coined by 
the West, did not stick.3 They alluded to predeces-
sors such as Portugal’s Clove Revolution in 1974, 
Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003, and Lebanon’s 
Cedar Revolution in 2005. The botanical names in-
dicated a connection with the color revolutions.4 
All these revolutions were fought from the center 
of their societies against archaic and rigid ruler-
ship structures. The term Arab Spring, prevalent 
in the Western media, connotes a thawing that has 
caused the authoritarian structures to melt away, 
as it were, instead of being replaced through 
coups, political assassinations or externally driven 
“regime changes” – such as that in Iraq in 2003 – 
as they have been to date. Skepticism regarding 
the spring metaphor is evident in some Arab com-
mentaries, as it implies democratization accord-
ing to a Western-biased model. Some thus refer 
instead to the “January 14th Revolution” in Tunisia 
and the “Egyptian Revolution” or, generally, the 
“Arab Revolution” (al-Thaura al-Arabiyya).5
The revolutions did not present themselves as 
socialist, liberal or Islamist, but rather as upris-
ings against the system with a broad social basis 
of support. There was no elite avant-garde at the 
forefront; they were supported far more by social 
networks with flat hierarchies. Instead of charis-
matic leaders, it was “heroes” such as Bouazizi or 
the blogger Khalid Said, who was beaten to death 
by Egyptian police in summer 2010, who deter-
mined their image.
In some countries, the demonstrations began 
on deeply symbolic days. In Egypt, 25 January is 
“Police Day”; it was violent attacks by the police 
that the young protesters came together to pro-
test on that day. In Bahrain 14 February was the 
anniversary of the 2001 referendum on a nation-
al reform charter, the implementation of which 
the demonstrators urged. In Libya several people 
demonstrating against the Muhammad caricatures 
3 Zine el-Abidin Ben Ali called his 1987 seizure of power the 
“Jasmine Revolution,” which is why the name is not viewed 
positively in Tunisia.
4 The Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 and the Green 
Revolution in Iran in 2009.
5 North African Berbers and Syrian Kurds who have participat-
ed in the revolts reject this term because it excludes them as 
non-Arab ethnic groups.
had been shot on 17 February 2006. A gathering of 
the victims’ relatives on the anniversary of their 
murder escalated into violence and marked the be-
ginning of the Libyan revolution. The opposition 
movements named themselves after special dates 
– for instance, the “14 January Front” in Tunisia, 
named after the day that Ben Ali left the country. 
The “14 February Movement” in Bahrain, the “20 
February Movement” in Morocco, the “15 March 
Movement” in the Palestinian territories, and the 
“Youth of 24 March” in Jordan named themselves 
after the initial, taboo-breaking mass demonstra-
tions in their respective countries.
Demonstration days were given proper names. 
The Day of Anger (Yaum al-Ghadab) marked the be-
ginning of the wave of protests in Egypt, Palestine, 
Bahrain, Iraq, Libya, Jordan, Yemen and Saudi 
Arabia. The repetition of the same name generat-
ed immediate connections between protests. The 
creation of further named days mobilized and 
escalated the protests: there was thus the Day of 
Dignity, the Day of Regret (on 7 March 2011 in Iraq) 
and the Day of the Country’s Protectors (27 May 
2011), which was directed at the Syrian soldiers to 
motivate them to change sides. In Syria local coor-
dination committees develop names and slogans 
for demonstrations that suit the situation; these 
are an important element of the staging and dra-
maturgy of the protest movements.
An additional border-transcending hallmark 
of the protests was the occupation of central 
streets and squares. In Tunisia it was at the Place 
de la Kasbah in Tunis that protesters camped out 
and raised their demands. Before the Arab Spring, 
demonstrations had already occasionally taken 
place on the Boulevard Habib Bourguiba. In Rabat 
rallies took place at the Avenue Mohamed V. 
However, it was Cairo’s Liberation Square (Midan 
al-Tahrir), where numerous demonstrations and 
occupations have taken place since 25 January 
2011, that became the common symbol of the Arab 
Spring. From the heart of Cairo and in close prox-
imity to symbolic buildings such as the secret ser-
vice headquarters, the Interior Ministry, the head 
office of the National Democratic Party (NDP) (in 
power at the time), and the Egyptian National 
Museum, images of the protesters were beamed 
over Al-Jazeera and many other media outlets to 
the whole world. The brutal attacks carried out 
by the former regime’s security forces and by vi-
olent thugs took place before running cameras – 
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possibly preventing worse excesses and complete-
ly discrediting Hosni Mubarak’s regime.
In Bahrain demonstrators copied the success-
ful Egyptian example and tried to continuously 
occupy Manama’s Pearl Roundabout (Dawwar al-
Lu’lu’ah) from 14 February 2011 on, despite the se-
curity forces’ violent course of action. The square 
is named after a gigantic statue that was erect-
ed in 1982 and symbolized the unity of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council. The regime feared that the 
square could become the emblem of a national 
uprising and had the distinctive statue torn down 
on 18 March 2011 after the square was forcibly 
cleared. In Yemen the regime used Sanaa’s sym-
bolic Liberation Square, which was occupied by 
Saleh loyalists, for its own purposes, while the op-
position erected its tents on the square in front 
of the university and renamed it the Square of 
Change (Sahat al-Taghyir).
With the occupation of the squares, each popu-
lation took possession of the geographical center – 
the heart of the nation, as it were – and “cleaned” 
it of the “corrupt” regime.6 The national flags be-
came a mobile part of this symbolism. In Libya 
the protesters and insurgents used the flag of the 
monarchy (1951–69) to link their movement to 
the pre-Qaddafi era. In Syria the opposition forc-
es have replaced the current flag with the one 
used before the Ba’ath party came to power. The 
Salafi Islamists in Egypt, who used the Saudi flag, 
were an exception. Berbers in Tunisia, Algeria and 
Morocco used their own flags – not, however, as 
an expression of separatism but rather of their 
common identity. The protests on Puerta del Sol 
in Madrid and on Rothschild Boulevard in Israel 
as well as the Occupy Movement in the U.S. and 
Europe drew upon the symbolism of the Arab 
Spring. The demonstrators adopted the action of 
occupying squares, the catchy names for demon-
stration days, and the ambitious claim of repre-
senting “the people” or “the 99 percent” against a 
small elite enriching itself excessively.
6 Following Hosni Mubarak’s overthrow, the demonstrators 
not only symbolically but also physically cleaned “their” lib-
erated square and made it the symbol of a new beginning. 
Since then protest demonstrations to defend the collectively 
won revolution have taken place there regularly.
Prospects for the Future
At the beginning of 2011, a transnational wave of 
protest – later to be referred to (in the West) as 
the Arab Spring – gripped North Africa and the 
Middle East. The process of change is irreversible, 
although its future course cannot be predicted at 
this time. Its outcome will depend greatly on how 
successful the democratic transitions of the repub-
lics of Tunisia and Egypt turn out to be, on wheth-
er a way out of the spiraling violence in Syria and 
Yemen is found, and finally on whether the re-
maining, only partially reformed autocracies have 
learned their lessons. What was the strength of the 
Arab Spring early on – namely, the largely leader-
less, ideologically unbiased challenging of the re-
pressive machine – is increasingly proving to be a 
weak point in the political autumn.
Given the delegitimization of the previous re-
gimes, the transitioning countries face the chal-
lenge of erecting state institutions and rules and 
regulations that have a wider legitimacy and re-
flect the participation of the broadest swath of 
society possible. In the wake of their respective 
revolutions, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have start-
ed building new institutions; in other countries 
(Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait), the differing 
demands of the various opposition groups for in-
stitutional reforms and concessions on the part of 
the regime have defined the post-revolution peri-
ods. Crisis management policies like those of the 
GCC states that are centered on the royalty giving 
gifts to their populations will not yield sustain-
able development and lasting stability; on the con-
trary, the gap between paternalistic rulers and in-
creasingly self-confident populations will widen.
The path to reform is rocky, as ideological pref-
erences and contradictory interests clash at every 
decision. The institutions that reciprocally support 
the legitimacy of the other institutions – the par-
liament, administration, judiciary, constitution-
al convention, president and security forces – first 
have to be reintroduced step by step: Should the 
institutional design begin with the rules and the 
constitution, or with democratically legitimized 
representation? Who will be authorized to set the 
electoral rules and monitor the elections, to deter-
mine which parties can participate and how to di-
vide up the constituencies? A more transparent 
and participatory process of negotiation, mutu-
al recognition and collaboration can lead to long-
term legitimacy and sustainable stability. One 
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possible danger is that parts of the population 
might view this process as dragging on too long 
and thus lose interest, resulting in a loss of cred-
ibility for the new institutions. The high expecta-
tions on all sides for a more just division of the na-
tional wealth and for a quick economic recovery 
following the overthrow of the corrupt rulers have 
not been fulfilled. Instead, the socioeconomic sit-
uation has worsened because many tourists have 
stayed away and businesses have suffered losses 
due to strikes and protests.
Moderate Islamists and radical Salafists are 
profiting in particular from this uncertain situ-
ation. Their religious ethos distinguishes them 
from other groups and enables them to soften the 
frustrations of the population regarding disap-
pointments and material losses by encouraging 
patience (as suggested by God) and reminding be-
lievers of the promise of rewards they can hope to 
gain in the hereafter. Their worldview is flexible 
enough to address a wide social spectrum of so-
ciety, but they are also authoritative and possess 
a strong ethical mandate. They address rural and 
urban citizens, uneducated people as well as intel-
lectuals, the young and old, and women and men 
in equal measure. Even before the Arab Spring, 
moderate Islamist groups such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood had already enjoyed significant suc-
cesses in (relatively) free elections (Jordan 1989, 
Algeria 1991, Egypt 2005, Palestinian Territories 
2006). Even though they were not always at the 
vanguard, they played a meaningful role through-
out the Arab Spring uprisings, and they enjoy a 
reputation of having continuously worked for 
years to oppose the authoritarian regimes. Because 
of their networks of religious, social and political 
institutions, they also have organizational struc-
tures and experience at their disposal that the 
new oppositional forces still do not have. That is 
why it was no surprise that they had such a good 
showing at the first free elections in Tunisia on 23 
October 2011, where they garnered 41.5 percent of 
the vote; in Morocco on 25 November 2011, where 
the moderate Islamist party PJD was the best-per-
forming party with 27 percent of the vote and 
where their candidate even became prime minis-
ter (Eibl 2011); and in Egypt and Kuwait, where 
they performed extraordinarily well in the most 
recent parliamentary elections. In upcoming elec-
tions in Libya, Yemen and Jordan, Islamists are be-
ing treated as viable candidates. 
So far, the moderate Islamists have proven 
themselves successful, especially in unisectarian 
countries. However, in multisectarian countries 
like Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia, Sunni and Shiite actors compete against 
each other: the Islamists seem to be reaching the 
limits of their inclusionary policies when it comes 
to the Sunni–Shiite divide. The strong showing 
of fundamentalist Salafists, who strive for a strict 
Islamicization of society and politics, has also been 
surprising. The Salafists could prove to be the big-
gest challenge for the moderate Islamists, as the 
former bring the latters’ devotion to Islam in ques-
tion. But in Egypt, it is already becoming clear that 
even the Salafists are subject to pressure to adapt 
to civilized political interactions and that they are 
starting to moderate their demands (Brown 2011).
The citizens of Arab countries are demanding 
the right to participate in politics, business and 
society, along with the freedom to decide which 
worldview they want to follow in designing their 
own lives. Instead of engaging militarily, the West 
should participate in the changes in the Middle 
East as a nonpaternalistic partner and take part in 
dialogues with the new political actors.
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